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Abstract: 
 
Evidence of declining trend in OECD economies’ income tax rates and the concern of 
enhancing competition in the US and the EU product markets subtly motivate the question if 
low income tax rates are optimal in an imperfectly competitive economy. This paper examines 
optimal income tax policy in a dynamic neoclassical model with monopoly distortions. A capital 
subsidy, motivated by low private returns to capital, provides strong incentive to invest, but the 
adverse welfare effect of investment is not perceived by capital owners. Since profit seeking 
investment worsens second best welfare, and this effect is only perceived by the government, 
there is a strong motivation to tax capital. The paper presents a numerical characterization of the 
Ramsey policy and shows that switching to a Ramsey policy involving a capital tax is welfare 
improving. 
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Taxing Capital in an Imperfectly Competitive Economy 
 
What is the optimal capital tax policy in an imperfectly competitive economy? There is an 
agreement on one principle --- with monopoly distortions, since output is lower than its optimal 
level, there must be some form of Pigovian element in optimal taxes, such that taxes offset the 
distortions created by monopoly power. This is the original idea behind Stiglitz & Dasgupta 
(1971)’s key result that in an imperfectly competitive economy optimal policy should include 
differential taxes and subsidies to transactions. Judd (1997) qualifies this general principle and 
argues that capital should be subsidized while labor and consumption should be taxed. Later, Guo 
& Lansing (1999) establish an ambiguity in capital tax policy. They establish that the long run 
optimal policy may involve capital tax or capital subsidy depending on the relative strength of 
profit effect and underinvestment effect. Profit-seeking investment persuades over accumulation 
of capital which motivates a capital tax, while the underinvestment effect, mainly due to 
discouraging private returns to capital, motivates the use of investment-boosting subsidy. 
 
The current paper examines the Ramsey (1927) tax policy in a simple dynamic general 
equilibrium model with an imperfectly competitive sector. The analysis is mainly focused on 
finding the welfare maximizing level of average effective capital tax rate and the welfare effects of 
capital tax policy and investment. The model introduces labor supply in both competitive and 
imperfectly competitive sectors which enables one to examine the capital tax policy with 
differential labor taxation. The key objective is to explore the optimal policy in light of welfare 
effects of profit seeking investment. Since monopoly power earns pure profits but induces loss in 
private return to capital, agents face conflicting demand for investment, and they can never get it 
right. They over invest in search of profit that distorts welfare directly; this in turns motivates the 
government to tax capital. On the other hand, under investment, due to low returns to capital, 
motivates the government to subsidize capital.  
 
This result is perfectly consistent with Guo & Lansing (1999). The current paper sharpens this 
result by providing the details of the welfare effect of investment. It shows that investment 
decision affect welfare directly but does not affect the government’s motivation to subsidize 
capital. In other words, and using Guo & Lansing’s (1999) terminology, while the 
underinvestment effect is completely independent of investment decisions, the welfare effect is not 
and is extremely sensitive. The adverse welfare effect of profit seeking investment is perceived by 
the government but not perceived by the investors. This creates a strong motivation to tax capital. 
In addition, the current paper numerically characterizes the welfare effect and the welfare cost of 
distorting taxes. It also shows that optimal labor tax in the monopoly sector is always lower than 
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optimal labor tax in competitive sector. Finally, it shows that significant welfare gains can be 
achieved by switching to a dynamic Ramsey policy in an imperfectly competitive economy. 
 
To my understanding, papers on optimal taxation with private market distortions that are of 
immediate relevance to this paper include Stiglitz & Dasgupta (1971), Diamond & Mirrlees 
(1971), Judd (1997), Guo & Lansing (1999), Auerbach & Hines Jr. (2001) and Judd (2002). One 
of the main results of Stiglitz & Dasgupta (1971) is that the optimal commodity tax policy for a 
monopolistic industry with a bound on profit taxation generally includes both differential taxes 
and subsidies. Diamond & Mirrlees (1971) argue that the existence of pure profits may require a 
deviation from the productive efficiency condition implying that taxes should generally be levied 
on final and not on intermediate goods. Judd (1997) and Judd (2002) establish the idea of 
subsidizing capital from a combination of these two results. Essentially, Ramsey’s idea of 
designing optimal taxes with minimum disincentive effects and minimum distortions is 
reminiscent of the relatively recent idea of designing optimal taxes that create smooth 
intertemporal wedges in allocations. Optimal income taxes should correspond to smooth tax 
distortions over time, implying that the wedge between marginal rate of substitution (MRS) of 
consumption and marginal rate of transformation (MRT) of consumption across different dates 
that is created by an income tax should be uniform over time. A capital tax creates a wedge 
between MRS and MRT that grows exponentially over time (see Judd (1997) for details). Since a 
capital tax violates this principle, Judd (1997) and Judd (2002) argue that capital should be 
subsidized while labor and consumption should be taxed. Later, Guo & Lansing (1999) show that 
with monopoly profits flowing as a fixed income to households, the government faces conflicting 
demands for capital subsidy and capital tax. Underinvestment effect due to discouraging private 
returns to capital demands a subsidy, while the government’s strong motivation to tax capital 
stems from profit seeking investment. 
 
Judd’s (1997) capital subsidy result is essentially based on the productive efficiency argument, i.e. 
the government should not tax capital since capital tax induced wedge in productive efficiency is 
ever growing. Subsidizing capital is optimal since a capital subsidy can push up the buyer price 
equal to social marginal cost of capital. If one assumes that profit is separately taxed, and it is 
possible to tax away all profits through windfall taxes, this result is in general technically robust. 
But if profit tax and capital tax are linked, there is a strong motivation to discourage investment. 
This is the key assumption of Guo & Lansing (1999), and the current paper. In addition, the 
current paper extends the Guo & Lansing (1999) result by providing an interpretation of their two-
effect result from the second best welfare point of view. Any investment that increases profits in 
the second best equilibrium is welfare worsening. If capital tax and profit tax are linked, 
subsidizing capital is tantamount to encouraging welfare worsening investment. Government’s 
motivation to tax capital is thus stronger if profit tax and capital tax are linked, an assumption 
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which is not held in Judd’s (1997) analysis. With a capital subsidy the effective return to capital 
would earn additional income in the form of a profit subsidy. Though the distortion effect 
motivates the use of a subsidy, a capital subsidy is likely to overcompensate capital owners, i.e. a 
capital subsidy would earn them a higher than optimal real return to capital. In the numerical 
exercise, this paper shows that the dynamic path of capital tax rates involves high tax for a number 
periods starting at the initial period, but then gradually converges to a small tax rate. In the steady 
state, the Ramsey policy therefore involves a capital tax. The calibration also shows that switching 
to this policy is associated with lower utility cost of taxation and higher levels of consumption, 
both of which attribute to higher level of welfare.  
 
The policy problem addressed in this paper is one of central importance. The OECD Revenue 
Statistics and various issues of OECD Observer suggest that there has been a general tendency 
amongst the OECD countries to cut the top marginal rates of income taxes and shift the revenue 
reliance more towards general consumption taxes. While the 1999 OECD average revenue share 
of consumption taxes was 32%, revenue share of corporate income tax and property tax in the 
same year were only 9% and 5.5%, respectively 2. On the other hand, empirical estimates of price 
mark ups, such as the Bayoumi, Laxton & Pesenti (2004) estimates of 1.23 for the US economy 
and 1.35 for the Euro area, motivate the concern of designing competition enhancing policy tools. 
The key question therefore is whether allowing tax favoured treatment to monopoly distorted 
returns is the optimal policy for imperfectly competitive economies. 
 
Tax reforms in most industrialized countries have shown clear tendency of moving towards 
simplistic capital tax policy involving lower (or no) amount of direct subsidy to capital and 
minimum amount of deductions. The main two objectives behind these reforms are (a) to 
encourage competition and innovation amongst firms, and (b) to increase the amount of 
corporation tax revenue. Various incentive schemes including investment tax credits and property 
related tax shelters have been moderated or abolished in numerous countries, such as Australia, 
Austria, Finland, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and the USA. Important evidence 
include the 1986 repeal of Investment Tax Credit Scheme in the USA.  More recently, the UK 
2006 tax reforms replaced the 0% starting rate of corporation profit tax and the starting marginal 
relief of corporation profit tax by a single 19% small companies’ profit tax for all companies with 
reported profit of £0-£300,000. The UK reform, for instance, is likely to allow small companies to 
focus on growing their businesses, increase (and invest) their profits by reducing their 
administrative burden, and encourage innovations and efficiency gains of their own. This 
simplification is likely to present a strong competitive challenge to incumbent firms, who are in 
                                                 
2 The OECD average of the revenue share of personal income tax in 1999 was 26.3%, which of course is a high 
proportion. Personal income tax revenue involves some revenue from taxing capital at the household level,  
although it is a minor proportion. The major source of capital tax revenue is the corporate income tax and property 
tax.    
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turns prompted to improve productivity. Prior to this reform, the 2004 budget introduced a 19% 
Non-Corporate Distribution Rate (NCDR) to ensure the incentive was focused on profits retained 
by small companies. This NCDR was charged on any profits distributed as dividend payments to 
individuals, rather than retained in the company to fund investment3. 
 
In addition, several OECD countries have revised the allowances for depreciation of capital 
equipment that companies can use to cut down on taxable income, bringing them nearer to the 
actual reduction in the economic value of the equipment. Most OECD countries’ top marginal 
rates of income tax have also been reduced. Table 1A in appendix presents a summary of the 
change in average effective tax rates (AETR) due to such reforms until year 2000. AETR is a 
measure of the average capital tax rate imposed on household’s income from capital, and thus 
provides a reasonable approximation of the capital tax rate imposed on a representative agent. The 
reported AETR estimates are from Carey & Tchilinguirian (2000), who use two methodologies. 
Both methodologies are presented in appendix, following table 1A. The AETR for capital includes 
corporate profit taxes, taxes on household capital income and various property taxes. All income 
generated from labor, social security charges (excluding employers’ contribution to private 
pension funds) and payroll taxes are allocated to AETR for labor. The approximations from both 
methodologies reflect that the AETR for labor and capital are much higher than AETR for 
consumption in all five major economies. This clearly shows the historical tendency of high 
reliance on income taxation for revenue. 
 
The recent trend, however, includes evidence of cutting down corporation tax rates with a purpose 
of increasing corporation tax revenue. The essential idea is that lower corporation tax rates provide 
lesser incentives for corporations to hide profits or evade taxes. Examples of this trend include 
Ireland (38% to 12.5%), Australia (36% to 30%), Denmark (32% to 30%), France (37.8% to 
35.4%), Germany (52% to 39%), Iceland (30% to 18%) and the Czech Republic (31% to 26%), of 
which Iceland, Ireland, Denmark, France and the Czech Republic have experienced immediate 
effect of an increase in corporate tax receipts. But this increased receipt may well be at the cost of 
increasing the effective capital tax rate. Due to the cut in corporation tax rates, there has been a 
mixed response in the effective capital tax rates in these countries. For instance, this figure has 
increased from 18.6% to 18.7% for Ireland, from 19.2% to 23.1% in Czech Republic, and from 
22.9% to 23.6% in France. By contrast, there has been a decline in the effective capital tax rate in 
Germany (21.1% to 19.9%), while in Australia it has remained unchanged at 28%.  
                                                 
3 In the UK, the starting rate of corporation tax was introduced in 2000 and reduced from 10% to 0% in 2002. It 
applied to companies with profits up to £10,000 per year, with marginal relief for companies with profits between 
£10,000 and £50,000 per year. Above this level, profits were taxed at the small companies’ rate of 19% (up to a 
threshold of £300,000). After the reduction of the starting rate to 0%, concerns were raised that the benefits of the 
rate were being used by incorporations not intending to grow. Therefore, at Budget 2004 the ‘non-corporate 
distribution rate’ (NCDR) was introduced to ensure the incentive was focused on profits retained by small 
companies. The NCDR charged 19% on any profits distributed as dividend payments to individuals, rather than 
retained in the company to fund investment. 
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The reason why this evidence is important for the current discussion is as follows. Although the 
ambiguity related to designing a competition enhancing capital tax policy remains unresolved (as 
in Guo & Lansing (1999)), providing tax favoured treatment to capital is not a strong solution 
either. Cutting capital tax rates, or at its extreme subsidizing capital (as in Judd (1997)) in order to 
achieve a target revenue or level of welfare is in fact far from simple, since any incentive to capital 
accumulation in an imperfectly competitive economy is also associated with an incentive to 
earning more profits. Pure profits from an industry with a fixed number of firms worsen welfare 
since such profits are associated with intertemporally accumulated deadweight loss of 
consumption. A competition enhancing optimal policy should discourage profit seeking 
investment which requires taxing capital. Judd (1997) finds an optimal policy involving capital 
subsidy primarily because his capital tax and profit taxes are independent. But any change in profit 
tax code imputes change in effective capital tax rate, and vice versa. Empirical evidence suggests 
that this change can go either way. This is understandable, since a change in profit tax code 
induces both an income and a substitution effect in capital allocation, and the net effect on capital 
tax rate depends on their relative strengths. The key idea is that household’s decision to 
accumulate capital in an imperfectly competitive economy is triggered by a motive to earn higher 
profits. The current paper argues that since with monopoly distortions productive efficiency 
condition is already violated, a capital tax is likely to offset the pre-existing distortions. The 
current paper also shows that the income and substitution effects of profit seeking investment 
reinforce each other and attribute to loss in welfare. It is, therefore, more intuitive to think of the 
optimal policy as one that discourages profit seeking and welfare worsening investment, which 
may result in a lower level of capital accumulation and higher level of consumption. 
 
 
The Model. 
 
Time t  is discrete and runs forever. The final goods sector is perfectly competitive (competitive 
sector, hereafter), and the intermediate goods sector is imperfectly competitive (monopoly sector, 
hereafter). Firms in competitive sector produce the final good, ty  (the numeraire), using labor, 
ytn , and a continuum ],[ 10Îj  of intermediate goods as inputs. Each firm in monopoly sector is 
a monopoly producer of a single intermediate good. Firm j  combines capital, jtk , and labor, 
zjtn , to produce intermediate good j  at the level jtz . Initial endowment of capital, one unit of 
time at each period and property rights of firms are owned by each of a continua of measure one of 
identical infinitely-lived households. The constant returns to scale technology used to produce the 
final good is: 
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Following Dixit & Stiglitz (1977) the elasticity of substitution between any two intermediate 
goods is equal to 1-s , and for )( 10 ®® ss  the monopoly sector possesses low (high) 
monopoly power. The technology for monopoly sector is: 
 
)1,0(;1 Î= - aaa zjtjtjt nkz     (2) 
The government consumes exogenous tg  of the final good each period and raises the required 
revenue by taxing households’ income from capital, profits, and labor, at rates tq , tkq , and stt  
for zys ,= , respectively. The government also trades one period real bonds, and let tb  denote 
the government’s indebtness to the private sector, denominated in time t  goods, maturing at the 
beginning of period t . The government’s period t  budget constraint is: 
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where ytw and zjtw  denote real wages, jtr  denotes rental price of capital, jtp  denotes pure 
profits from monopoly sector, and tR  denotes the gross rate of return on one-period bonds held 
from t  to 1+t , denominated in units of time t  goods. I will only focus on policy with full 
commitment. Tax rate on pure distributed profits is linked to the capital tax rate. The tax code that 
Judd (1997) modelled is a demarcated tax code that specifies tax instruments for corporate profits, 
savings and investment. Judd (1997) assumes a fixed profit tax rate, which stands instrumental in 
deriving the optimal policy involving no subsidy to profits but subsidy to capital income. Prior to 
the current paper, Guo & Lansing (1999) proposes a similar link of capital tax rate and profit tax 
rate, but uses a rich capital tax code involving accelerated depreciation4. In the current setting the 
capital tax rate is the average effective tax rate on income from capital. The parameter 0³k  
represents the tax treatment of distributed corporate profits. For instance, the restriction ],[ 10Îk  
                                                 
4 Guo & Lansing’s (1999) tax code involved depreciation allowance as a means to subsidize capital income. 
Depreciation allowances in excess of economic depreciation are another form of investment subsidy which is in 
practice, in a rather generous fashion, in both the US and the UK tax codes. In the UK, starting from 1972 the 
initial allowance received by industrial buildings ranged between 40% and 75%. Inventories received tax relief due 
to high inflation in the 1970s. According to the US corporate tax structure, physical rents from capital are taxed at 
a constant rate after the allowance of a deduction for depreciation.  
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in the current setting implies the set of tax treatments ],[ taxcapitalwithparattaxno  for 
distributed corporate profits5. 
 
The representative firm in the competitive sector faces the following sequence of problems: 
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where jp  denotes the relative price of j . The first order conditions associated with (4) yields the 
demand function n
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n
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ytjttjt nzyp  for the j th  intermediate good. The profit 
maximization problem of the j th firm in the monopoly sector is: 
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I will restrict attention to a symmetric equilibrium where all firms in the monopoly sector produce 
at the same level, employ the same levels of factors and charge the same relative price, such that 
ztzjt nn = , tjt kk =  and tjt pp =  for all j . The representative household derives utility from 
consumption and disutility from labor service. Its maximization problem is: 
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where )1,0(Îb  is the subjective discount rate, 00 0 bk ,>  given, and ),( 10Îd  is the capital 
depreciation rate. The utility function RR: ®+
3u  has standard properties6. 
 
                                                 
5 In principle, ignoring the possibility of more than 100% tax on distributed corporate profits, the restriction 
01 ³³- kq t would be more appropriate, since 
1-= tqk then would represent the case where distributed profits 
are taxed at the 100% rate. But for most parts of the analysis to follow, I will consider ],[ 10Îk . This is because 
although a 100% tax on profits is optimal, it is an impractical policy option. 
6 RR: ®+
3u  is continuously differentiable, strictly increasing in consumption, decreasing in labor, strictly 
concave, and satisfies Inada conditions, namely ,)()]([lim ¥=-® tutu cnsct
1
0  and 0
1 =-¥® )()]([lim tutu cnsct  
for zys ,= . 
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Definition 1 (Symmetric Equilibrium).  A symmetric equilibrium is a 5-tuple of 
price sequences 
¥
=0ttttztyt Rrpww },,,,{  that depends on the government policy 
¥
=0tttztyt b },,,{ qtt  and supports an allocation 
¥
=0ttttztytt yzknnc },,,,,{ , such that 
§ given the price system, government policy and ¥=0ttg }{ , the allocation solves (4), 
(5) and (6); 
§ given the price system, allocation and ¥=0ttg }{ , the government policy satisfies the 
symmetric version of (3); 
§ all markets clear in the long run, i.e. allocations satisfy the resource constraint 
tytzttttt knnkkgc )(
)( dnanan -+=++ --+ 1
11
1 .      
 
Given ¥=0ttg }{ , 0b  and 0k ,  the symmetric equilibrium consists of time path of allocations 
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solves the following system (7): 
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Further to (7), the price mark up ratio can be derived by redefin ing the monopoly sector firm’s 
problem as one of choosing output to maximize profits. If ),,( tzttt rwzTC  denotes the total cost 
function for the firm, the first order condition ),,()( zttttt wrzMCp
11 --= s  implies that the 
price mark up ratio is equal to 11 -- )( s . The profit to output ratio for this model economy is 
equal to ns , and the three income shares add up to ns-1 . 
 
Consider a special case with tbt "= ,0 , and there is an access to lump sum taxes )( tlº . This 
would enable the government implement the first best tax policy which replicates the pareto 
optimum, i.e. the social planner’s equilibrium. The social planner’s equilibrium is defined by a 
system including (7d&l) and the followings : 
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Proposition 1: The first best fiscal policy is to (a) set zero labor tax in competitive 
sector, (b) set a uniform labor and capital subsidy in monopoly sector, and (c) impose 
)]([
)(
ks
s
ns
--
-
+= 11
1 ttt
ygl  as lump sum tax. The lump sum tax is strictly greater 
than tg . 
 
Proof:  See Appendix P1. 
 
Tax distortions are minimized under the first best policy that prescribes zero tax in competitive 
sector and a uniform subsidy to restore monopoly induced wedge between social and private 
marginal returns to factors. This policy corresponds to the first best since the resulting allocations 
imitate the pareto optimal allocations. This policy is optimal because the uniform subsidies, paid 
entirely from the large lump sum tax, do not distort any allocations. 
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Optimal Taxation. 
 
Given the current setting, a lump sum tax that is higher than government expenditure can impose 
serious practicality concerns. Impracticality of first best lump sum taxes has been the central 
motivation of second best, or optimal taxation. Consider the second best scenario, with 0¹tb . 
The Ramsey problem is the government’s problem of choosing implementable distorting taxes 
that maximize welfare. The primal approach to this problem is one that characterizes the 
government’s quest of choosing allocations to maximize welfare subject to the resource constraint 
(7d), and an implementability constraint that ensure that resulting taxes, prices and allocations are 
consistent with equilibrium system (7). Once the Ramsey problem is solved, the resulting Ramsey 
allocations, given the initial conditions },,{ 000 bkR , can be used to recover a sequence of prices 
¥
=0ttttytzt Rprww },,,,{  and policy variables 
¥
=0tttytzt b },,,{ qtt  that will support the Ramsey 
allocations as a decentralized equilibrium. A formulation convenient for the Ramsey problem is to 
construct the wealth constraint from the income flow constraint. The wealth constraint of the 
household is: 
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where the Arrow-Debreu price7 is 
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oq . The representative household chooses ¥=0tztytt nnc },,{  to maximize utility subject to 
(9.2). The consolidated first order conditions are )()( tuuq c
t
c
o
t b=0  and (7j). The 
implementability constraint is derived by substituting out taxes, factor prices and Arrow-Debreu 
price in (9.2) using )()( tuuq c
t
c
o
t b=0 , (7i,j&k). This results in: 
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where 
                                                 
7 otq  is the relative price of the final good in period t  in terms of the final good in period zero, so 
oq0  is the 
relative price of the final good in period zero in terms of the final good in period zero. 
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1
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effective real return to capital is equal to ú
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0¹k  not only pushes buyer price up to social marginal return, but also pays capital owners an 
extra compensation. Put differently, an implementable capital subsidy with 0¹k  
overcompensates capital owners at the cost of higher debt or higher labor taxes. This is an 
implementable policy where a capital subsidy attains socially optimal level of capital 
accumulation if and only if profits are not taxed or subsidized, i.e. if and only if 0=k . This 
policy, however, does not discourage profits and does not encourage competition. Later it is 
shown that the Ramsey policy supports a capital subsidy that attains socially optimal level of 
capital with a complete confiscation of profits. 
 
The Ramsey problem is to choose allocations to maximize welfare subject to constraints (7d) and 
(9.2). Let 0³F  denote the Lagrange multiplier associated with (9.2). Define the second best 
welfare function as: 
 
]))(()()()([),,(),,,,( ttcztnzytnytcztytttztytt tuntuntuctunncuknncV pkq--++F+ºF 1
          (9.4) 
where tt pkq )( -1  is defined by (9.3b). Let 
¥
=0tt }{c  be the sequence of Lagrange multiplier on 
(7d). The second best level of welfare is equal to first best level of welfare less the loss in welfare 
due to after tax profits and distorting taxes. The loss in welfare is measured in terms of loss in 
allocations due to symmetric equilibrium reaction of taxpayers, which is multiplied by the shadow 
price of taxes F . This multiplier’s value is representative of the amount in terms of consumption 
taxpayers are willing pay in order to replace a unit of distorting tax with a unit of lump sum tax. 
The Ramsey equilibrium conditions are (7d), (9.3) and the followings: 
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The Ramsey equilibrium taxes satisfy (9.5) and generate allocations and prices that are consistent 
with equilibrium (7) and implementability constraint (9.3). The presence of profits in the 
implementability constraint (9.3) implies that investment in physical capital induces a direct effect 
on second best welfare, though this effect is not perceived by capital owners. Return to investment 
in physical capital perceived by the households is characterized by the Euler equation: 
 
[ ] 0111 11 =-+-+- ++ dqb ttcc rtutu )()()(      (9.6a) 
Return to investment in physical capital perceived by the government is characterized by: 
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Ramsey equilibrium taxes are chosen such that (9.6b) is consistent with (9.6a). The government’s 
perception includes the term 
)1(
)1(
+
+
tV
tV
c
k . Since the function (.)V  represents a measure of (second 
best) welfare in the Ramsey equilibrium, the derivatives )1( +tVk  and )1( +tVc  represent the 
marginal effect of capital accumulation and consumption on second best welfare. Their ratio, 
therefore, is a measure of the relative effect of investment in physical capital on second best 
welfare. To illustrate it further, consider proposition 2 with the following: 
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Proposition 2: In the Ramsey equilibrium, any additional investment worsens 
welfare. This effect is perceived by the government but not perceived by investors. 
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Proof:  See Appendix P2. 
 
The marginal effect of investment on second best welfare, represented by (9.6c), can be 
decomposed into substitution and income effects of investment. The substitution effect is 
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tu ))(( , which represents the loss in welfare due to the margin of loss of 
a period ahead consumption. Since the final good is used for consumption and investment, 
additional investment requires substituting consumption for further capital stock. If, say, profit tax 
is equal to q  (i.e. 1=k ), profit seeking investment reduces next period’s consumption by an 
amount ú
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é
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t
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tu ))(( , which characterizes the government’s perceived deviation 
from second best consumption level. Since the multiplier F  represents the utility cost of 
distorting taxes, F  adjusted deviation in welfare represents a utility measure of the loss in 
welfare. If profits are not taxed or subsidized at all, the income effect, i.e.  
ú
û
ù
ê
ë
é
-
+F- +
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r
tu  characterizes the government’s perceived loss in welfare due to loss in 
private return to capital. Any )1,0(Îk  in (9.6c) implies that both these effects are strictly 
negative, and therefore reinforce each other to lower welfare. Thus any additional investment 
lowers welfare. 
 
 
Ramsey Policy. 
 
For tracking analytical results, assume RR 3 ®+:u  is separable in consumption and labor, and 
linear in labor, i.e. 0==== )()()()( tutututu nsnlnsnsnsccns , ,,, zyls =  and sl ¹ . This 
assumption is consistent with Hansen (1985). Assume also that there exists a 0T ³  for which 
gg t =  for all Tt ³ , and solution to the Ramsey problem converges to a time-invariant 
allocation. Solving (9.5) and (8) for steady state allocations yield: 
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Proposition 3: The steady state Ramsey policy is to set lower  labor tax in 
monopoly sector, and a capital tax or subsidy depending on the relative strengths of the 
monopoly distortion effect and the welfare effect of investment. If the distortion effect 
(welfare effect) dominates, the long run optimal policy involves a capital subsidy (a tax). 
 
Proof:  See Appendix P3. 
 
Both (9.7a) and (9.7b) are consistent with competitive market analogue, i.e. for 0®s , 
yz tt ®  and 0®q . By contrast, since )1,0(Îs  the optimal labor tax for the monopoly 
sector is the sum of two elements, namely, the first best subsidy, and the price mark up adjusted 
optimal labor tax for the competitive sector. Due to monopoly distortions, the private marginal 
return to labor in the monopoly sector is lower than the social marginal return. It is therefore 
optimal to set the labor tax rate for this sector lower than a competitive sector’s labor tax such that 
the distorted efficiency margins are corrected. This is the differential taxation principle, consistent 
with Stiglitz & Dasgupta (1971). 
 
The two effect result of optimal capital tax is perfectly consistent with the finding of Guo & 
Lansing (1999), and the current interpretation draws insights from the welfare effects of second 
best capital taxation. The first effect which is due to monopoly distortions is simply equal to the 
first best subsidy; in other words, it is one minus the price mark up. This is the amount lost in 
private marginal returns and is analytically equivalent to the underinvestment effect in Guo & 
Lansing (1999). Interestingly, this effect is completely independent of the level of investment, but 
the only motivation to subsidize capital is due to this effect. The welfare effect of investment 
stems from profit seeking investment. Since the loss in welfare is not perceived by households, 
investment is tempting for higher profits. This effect motivates the government to use a capital tax 
and discourage profit seeking investment. This is because ú
û
ù
ê
ë
é
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-= )(
)(
d
sb
1
1
1 r
V
V
c
k , and in a 
zero profit competitive market equilibrium kV  would equal zero. By contrast in the presence of 
pure profits, the welfare effect of investment in terms of consumption good is strictly negative. 
The Ramsey policy for capital taxation is therefore determined by the relative strengths of these 
two effects. If the welfare effect (distortion effect) dominates the distortion effect (welfare effect), 
the Ramsey policy is a capital tax (a capital subsidy). 
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The equilibrium cost of capital in this setting is determined by total distortion created by the 
interaction of taxation and monopoly power. Since the before tax return to capital is equal to 
)( s-1  times the marginal product of capital, the after tax return to capital is equal to 
))(( qs -- 11  times the marginal product of capital. This simply implies that monopoly 
distortion acts like a second (and privately imposed) tax rate on capital income. If for instance, 
s = 0.15, a 18% capital subsidy reinstates socially optimal outcome by setting ))(( qs -- 11 = 
1. But since profit tax in linked to capital tax, a capital subsidy must be accompanied with a profit 
subsidy, and a policy encouraging welfare worsening profits cannot be optimal. This is because 
the net effective return to capital includes an additional term 
)( sa
ks
-1
, implying that any capital 
subsidy not only pushes private return up to social marginal return to capital, but also provides 
additional profit income. Proposed earlier by Judd (1997), a trivial solution is to tax profits 
separately at 100% rate and subsidize capital. This result can be recovered from the current 
setting, as summarized in Proposition 4. 
 
Proposition 4: If profits are taxed at a given rate, the steady state Ramsey policy 
involves a capital subsidy if and only if profits are taxed at 100% rate. The optimal 
capital subsidy with 100% profit tax replicates first best allocation of capital. 
 
Proof:  See Appendix P4. 
 
Ramsey capital subsidy can be implemented if one replaces the endogenous profit tax with a given 
profit tax and if and only if one allows for full confiscation of profits at each point in time. This is 
tantamount to saying that the Judd (1997) result is equivalent to the first best tax policy that 
prescribes homogenous subsidy to monopoly distorted private returns at the expense of a large 
lump sum tax equivalent (the windfall tax). 
 
Proposition 5: The steady state Ramsey policy does not involve zero capital tax. 
 
Proof:  See Appendix P5. 
 
Allocations which are consistent with a zero capital tax result are not implementable in (7). Put 
differently, the distortion effect and the welfare effect do not completely cancel out each other. 
This important result is based on proposition 2. Since the household’s perception of the return to 
investment is always different from the government’s perception, investors will never get the right 
amount invested, which is why a zero capital tax cannot be implemented. 
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Calibration and Numerical Results. 
 
The calibration is only representative of a numerical characterization of the analytics presented in 
this paper. I use 1960-2002 data from the US economy. The time period is considered to be one 
year which is consistent with frequency of revision of fiscal decision. The calibration estimates, 
for a given initial tax policy, the path of tax rates that achieves a new steady state allocations and 
Ramsey taxes. For utility, it is assumed that (.)u  follows lottery argument of Hansen (1985): 
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      (9.8) 
The set of parameters for the model is ),,,,,,,( zgdbksna . The parameters 
),,,,,( dbksna  are pinned down to match the steady state characteristics identified from the 
US data. The parameter g  is chosen from Cooley & Prescott (1995). The parameter z  is 
normalized to 1. This gives the baseline values for the set of parameters. I assume that the US 
economy is in a steady state under the current tax system. This steady state corresponds to taxes 
and allocations which will be treated as the taxes and allocations for 0=t  for calibrating the 
model. In order to pin down the parameters, I will use the steady state ratios of the US economy 
based on US data for time period 1960-2002. These statistics are from annual data of the US 
economy’s real output, government consumption, government debt and corporate profits for the 
period 1960-2002, collected from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Economic Data-FRED II, 
summarized in table 2A in appendix. Annual data for the US economy’s capital stock and 
investment for the period 1960-1996 are collected from the US Department of Commerce’s 
Revised Fixed Reproducible Tangible Wealth in the United States. The series for capital and 
investment include business equipment and structures, residential components and consumer 
durables. This data gives average government consumption to output ratio equal to 0.23, profit to 
output ratio equal to 0.11, bond to output ratio equal to 0.51, capital to output ratio equal to 3.31, 
and investment to output ratio equal to 0.22. These steady state ratios will be part of the set of 
initial allocations. Current average effective tax rates for the US economy are chosen from Carrey 
& Tchilinguirian (2000), equal to 27.3%, 22.6% and 6.1% for capital income, labor income and 
consumption, respectively. Given these allocations and the parameters, I will solve the following 
system of equations (9.9) representing a decentralized equilibrium at 0=t . 
0
1
0
1
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The equilibrium (9.9) is a 0=t  version of (7) with a consumption tax 0ct  and sector indifferent 
labor tax , i.e. 000 ttt == yz . This is to make the 0=t  version of the model a close imitation 
of the current US tax policy. I will assume that the US economy switches to a Ramsey policy 
involving no consumption tax and differential labor tax from 1=t . This requires recursive 
solution of the Ramsey equilibrium defined by (7d), (9.3) & (9.5), and symmetric equilibrium (7) 
for 1³t  until tax rates, allocations and prices converge to a new steady state. The process of 
recursive solution assumes that there is zero exogenous growth in output, implying that all 
intertemporal changes in allocations are due to variable tax rates during transition which alters the 
relative prices. Thus the transition to new steady state is consistent with revenue neutral taxation 
(since government revenue is fixed each period). The tax smoothing stems from the intertemporal 
allocation of government bonds, implying that the dynamic allocation response and price changes 
are purely due to changes in tax rates which alter the incentives to consume, save and borrow. In 
order to avoid confiscatory taxation of capital, the following restriction is imposed in the Ramsey 
problem: 
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The calibration is therefore aimed at imitating the transition to new steady state if the fiscal setting 
of the economy is switched to Ramsey policy involving no consumption tax, sector specific labor 
tax and capital tax. In other words, given the current tax policy, the calibrated tax rates will 
represent the path of tax rates on capital income and labor income that are required to implement 
the dynamic Ramsey tax policy. This requires a description of the economy in terms of its current 
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and future tax policy. The decentralized equilibrium (9.9) will be held as representative of the 
allocations and prices due to the current tax policy, and it will be assumed that these rates are 
expected, with probability one, to remain at these levels forever. The new policy is announced at 
0=t  and is carried through 1³t . 
 
The baseline parameter values are presented in table 2B in appendix. The parameter b  is 
consistent with annual real interest rate of 4%. The value of the parameter k  stands for the fiscal 
treatment of profits and is the ratio between tax on distributed profit and capital tax. The tax on 
distributed profits for the US economy, from McGrattan & Prescott (2005)’s period average 
estimate for 1990-2000, is 17.4%. The parameter k  is pinned down combining McGrattan & 
Prescott (2005)’s estimate of 17.4% and Carrey & Tchilinguirian (2000)’s estimated average 
effective capital tax rate for the US economy. In order to pin down the production parameters, one 
needs to assume that there is a fixed proportion of income that flows to one factor. The income 
shares of capital and labor in the current setting add up to 0.89 (one minus the profit ratio). I set 
capital’s share of final output equal to 0.36, an approximation consistent with long run US data, 
and also frequently used in relevant literature (see for instance Cooley & Prescott (1995)). This is 
consistent with ),,( asn = (0.73, 0.15, 0.57).  
 
The calibrated value for the parameter s  yields the price mark up ratio equal to 1.17, which is a 
reasonable approximation of the range of values typically used in established literature, such as the 
ones presented in Martins, Scarpetta & Pilat (1996), Basu & Fernald (1997) and Bayoumi et al. 
(2004). Using the target statistics one can pin down d . This specifications, and the given initial 
tax rates are consistent with 0zn  = 0.15, 0yn = 0.44, 0zw  = 1.69, 0yw = 0.59, 0r = 0.10, 1k = 3.26, 
which can be verified by solving (9.9) for allocations and prices, given 000000 qtp ,,,,, bkc  and 
baseline parameter values. The recursive solution of the Ramsey equilibrium and the symmetric 
equilibrium can be complicated. This is because for each feasible Ramsey tax policy, the resulting 
allocations and prices must be consistent with symmetric equilibrium. Thus each set of Ramsey 
allocations and prices generating from a Ramsey equilibrium tax rate must also satisfy symmetric 
equilibrium (7) for all 1³t . In principle, for a fixed F  numerous tax combinations can solve the 
Ramsey equilibrium for a set of allocations and prices, but not all these are consistent with (7). 
The implementable tax policy for all 1³t  is a dynamic path of taxes that solves the Ramsey 
equilibrium such that the resulting dynamic path of allocations and prices along with the path of 
taxes are consistent with symmetric equilibrium (7) for all 1³t . Therefore, implementability 
requires that for 1³t  Ramsey tax rates at each point in time generates allocations and prices that 
satisfy the representative household’s budget constraint with equality (the government’s budget 
constraint will hold with equality by Walras’ Law). For this type of solution f irst it is necessary to 
calibrate F , i.e. the present value Lagrange multiplier associated with the implementability 
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constraint. Calibrating F  is rather simple; it requires solving (9.5e) and (9.5f) for the initial 
allocations and prices, which results in F = 0.206. Note that with (9.8): 
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Solve (9.5h), (9.5e) and (9.5a) equivalent Ramsey equilibrium conditions with (10.1), and 
substitute for )(),(),( 110 kcc VVV  from (10.2) and (10.3) in order to derive 1c  = 0.616. This is the 
implementable consumption allocation for 1=t  that is generated by a Ramsey capital tax for 
1=t . This allocation and its corresponding prices must be consistent with both (9.6a) and (9.6b) 
for 1=t . This set of allocations and its corresponding prices satisfy Ramsey equilibrium and 
symmetric equilibrium (7) for 1=t , implying that factor prices, labor supply for 1=t  and 
capital stock for 2=t  are 1zw  = 1.68, 1yw = 0.59, 1r = 0.11, 1zn  = 0.16, 1yn = 0.44, and 2k = 
3.14. In order to solve for Ramsey allocations, prices and taxes for 1>t , one needs to consider 
only (9.5a-d) and (7) for for 1>t . The same recursive solution process in (9.5a-d) and (7) can be 
repeated for 1>t  until tax rates, allocations and prices converge to some constant, i.e. until the 
dynamic system converges to a new steady state. 
 
The dynamic path of Ramsey taxes that achieve a new steady state is summarized in table 3. It 
presents the first best tax rates, and the dynamic path of tax rates if the policy is switched to a 
Ramsey policy involving no consumption tax, sector specific labor taxes and a capital tax. The 
first best tax policy is computed for given initial tax rates. This policy is time invariant. The lump 
sum tax equivalent required to implement this policy is equal to 35% of initial output level. The 
computation of dynamic path of Ramsey taxes suggests that the process of convergence is 
relatively slow. A current switch to Ramsey policy requires 8 years to reach the new steady state 
level of labor taxes (a 2% subsidy in monopoly sector, a 14% tax in competitive sector) and 
capital tax (12%). This switch requires taxing capital at 100% rate for 5 years starting from the 
initial period, and then reducing the rate to 22% and to 12%. In the first year, labor in monopoly 
sector receives a 35% subsidy. This rate drops to 11% in the second year and continues to drop 
thereafter until it reaches its steady state level of 2%. Labor in competitive sector gets a low tax in 
the first year but high tax in the second year. From the third year this tax rate starts to decline until 
it reaches its steady state level of 14%. The new steady state level of consumption ratio is 0.64 and 
capital stock is 2.25, with factor prices zw  = 1.68, yw = 0.59, and r = 0.16. The new Ramsey 
policy results in a steady state level of higher consumption and lower capital per worker. 
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Importantly, it leaves leisure unchanged. This amounts to a 17% increase in consumption level as 
compared to the initial level, implying that it requires 17% more consumption to make the 
taxpayers indifferent between the old and the new tax policy. If the policy is switched to the 
Ramsey policy, the level of second best welfare (i.e. ),,,,( ***** FknncV zy ) increases from 
2.65 (in the old policy) to 2.78 (in the new policy, after 8 years). This is tantamount to a 5% 
welfare increase in 8 years. This increase in welfare is measured with the same F  since F  is 
time invariant and the old policy’s steady state represents the time 0 state of the new policy. It 
simply states that a 5% welfare increase in 8 years makes taxpayers indifferent between 
continuing with the old policy and choosing to switch to a new policy.  
 
The idea that there are welfare gains from switching to Ramsey policy is reinforced in figure 4A. 
In particular, figures 4A, 4B and 4C presents the efficiency of Ramsey policy for a range of values 
for the parameters s  and k 8. The utility cost of distorting taxes, F , is a measure of social cost 
of taxation, i.e. the amount in consumption (or utility) taxpayers are willing to give up in order to 
get rid of a distorting tax. The declining value of the utility cost of Ramsey taxes (for high values 
of s ) in figure 4A suggests that economic agents prefer Ramsey policy than first best policy for 
high price mark up ratio. Ramsey policy compensates for monopoly distortions and induces lesser 
welfare cost than a heavy lump sum tax. Higher degrees of monopoly power results in higher 
losses of output and drives a larger wedge between social and private returns to factors, which in 
turn distorts the work and investment incentives. Although a first best subsidy can be used to 
compensate the wedge, a heavy lump sum tax in addition reduces disposable income. The Ramsey 
policy for high degrees of monopoly power diversifies the tax burdens and reduces the social cost 
of distorting taxes. With excessively high degrees of monopoly power households are willing to 
pay lesser amount in terms of consumption goods to replace one unit of distorting tax by one unit 
of lump sum tax. Not surprisingly, this is also true for higher values of the parameter k , as in 
figure 4C. The more the tax on distributed profits, the less is the government’s reliance on taxing 
other transactions. Consequently, for high values of the parameter k  the welfare cost of Ramsey 
taxes is low, and Ramsey taxes are preferred over lump sum tax. For any level of k  the steady 
state capital tax policy is unchanged, implying that government’s tax treatment of profits cannot 
influence its choice of capital tax rate. Changes in s  however affects the steady state level of 
capital tax rate. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8 Note that varying s  or k  requires recalibrating F . In addition, varying s  requires recalibrating n  and a . 
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Concluding Remarks. 
 
The paper examines the optimal capital tax policy in a simple two sector general equilibrium 
model of imperfect competition. It shows that imperfect competition and existence of pure profits 
creates a conflicting demand for investment. This is mainly why capital owners either over invest 
or under invest. Capital owners over invest in search of pure profits, but cannot perceive the 
adverse welfare effect of investment. On the other hand, private returns to capital are low which 
requires subsidy to capital in order to push the return up to socially optimal level. The government 
therefore is motivated to use a subsidy or a tax to capital depending on the relative strength of 
distortion effect and welfare effect. The distortion effect motivates the use of a capital subsidy, 
while the relative effect of investment on welfare supports the use of a capital tax. This result is 
perfectly consistent with the main result of Guo & Lansing (1999). In addition, the current paper 
establishes that any investment in monopoly distorted equilibrium is welfare worsening, since both 
substitution and income effect of additional investment are negative and jointly attribute to loss in 
future consumption. One way to compensate capital owners may be to completely tax away profits 
and subsidize capital income. If taxing away profits in each period is impractical, the Ramsey 
policy involving a capital tax can discourage profit seeking investment and can induce welfare 
gains. For an empirically plausible set of parameters which are consistent with long run 
characteristics of the US economy, it finds that the optimal policy involves a capital tax. It also 
finds that this policy results in higher consumption and lower capital per worker, but leaves leisure 
unchanged, all of which contribute to a gain in welfare level. 
 
For high degrees of monopoly power Ramsey taxes induce lesser welfare cost since they 
neutralize the distortions created by monopoly pricing. Both monopoly power and income taxes 
induce distortions in allocations and are associated with signific ant welfare costs. In a recent paper 
Jonsson (2004) presents a quantitative analysis of the US economy’s welfare costs due to 
monopoly power and taxation, and reports the steady state estimates of the welfare cost of 
imperfect competition in product market and distorting taxes are 48.26% and 12.79%, 
respectively. Moreover, based on the computed welfare cost approximations, Jonsson (2004) 
establishes that in an economy with imperfectly (perfectly) competitive markets labor taxes are 
more (less) distorting than capital taxes. From this point of view, the current paper’s key finding 
of a nonzero limiting capital tax/subsidy in principle is less distorting than what it would have 
been if markets were perfectly competitive. 
 
The model avoided much of game theoretic complexities by specifying market distortions in a 
simple reduced form. This reduced form specification is not based on a completely specified 
model of market structure and conduct. Nevertheless, one can conveniently map this form of 
market distortions to several alternative specifications of imperfect competition. The market 
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distortions and equilibrium profits in the current setting is entirely based on the assumption that 
there is, at each point in time, a fixed number of firms operating in the monopoly sector who 
exploit the imperfect substitutability between intermediate goods. Since there is no fixed cost, pure 
profits is likely to lead to entry which will reduce the flow of profits to households. But even if 
one imposes free entry and steady state zero profits, their will be accumulated welfare distortions 
along the transition, which will motivate a capital tax to discourage profit seeking investment. 
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Appendix: Proofs of propositions. 
 
P1: Proof of Proposition 1. 
Set 0=tb  and add tl  to the right hand side of (7n). Compare (7f, g, h, j, k) with (8.1) to derive 
0
1
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-
-
===
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,
s
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qtt tztyt . Substituting for these taxes in (7n) with tl  yields: 
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which is strictly positive, and strictly greater than tg .     ·  
 
P2: Proof of Proposition 2. 
It is straightforward to show from (9.5a) and (9.5d) that 0)( >tVc  for all t . From (9.6c), the 
term { })()1)(1( 1 tutu cc ---+ bd  is strictly negative as long as 1£tq . Hence, 0)( <tVk  for all 
t , i.e. profit seeking investment directly distorts welfare at each point in time. This effect is not 
perceived in (9.6a), i.e. household’s Euler equation does not capture this effect.  ·  
 
 
P3: Proof of Proposition 3. 
For any ),( 10Îs , 11 1 >- -)( s . Equation (9.7a) implies yz tt < . Furthermore (9.7b) implies 
for ),( 10Îs  the two effects which determine the sign and magnitude of q  are 
s
s
-
-
1
, which 
represents the monopoly distortion effect, and 
c
k
rV
V , which is a measure of the relative effect of 
investment on second best welfare. Since 0,0 >< ck VV , the term ÷÷
ø
ö
çç
è
æ
-
c
k
rV
V  is strictly positive. If 
the relative effect of investment on second best welfare is stronger (weaker) than the monopoly 
distortion effect, the long run optimal policy involves a capital tax (a capital subsidy). ·  
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P4: Proof of Proposition 4. 
Say the fixed rate of profit tax is Pt . Denote the Lagrange multiplier on implementability 
constraint by F . With Pt , the welfare effect of investment is 
s
tns
-
-+F-=+ +P 1
)1()1()1( 1tck
r
tutV , and its level in steady state is: 
s
tns
-
-F-= P 1
)1(
r
uV ck        (P4a) 
Equation (P.4a) implies that 0=kV  and s
s
q
-
-
=
1
, if and only if 1=Pt .   ·  
 
P5: Proof of Proposition 5. 
Say not, and say for some implementable allocations Ramsey equilibrium policy prescribes 
0=q . (9.7b) and steady state version of (9.6a) imply: 
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       (P5a) 
With 0=q , (P4a) implies ][ db -+=- 11 r , which contradicts (9.6a).   ·  
 
 
Appendix: Tables & Figures. 
 
Table 1A: Average Effective Tax Rates (in per cent), 1991-97. 
 Capital Taxa Labor Tax Consumption Tax 
  Mendoza et 
al. (1994) 
Carrey & 
Tchilinguirian 
(2000)  
Mendoza et 
al. (1994) 
Carrey & 
Tchilinguirian 
(2000)  
Mendoza et 
al. (1994) 
Carrey & 
Tchilinguirian 
(2000)  
USA 27.3 31.1 26.7 22.6 5.2 6.1 
UK 31.9 38.4 23.7 21.0 16.7 16.9 
Japan 24.1 32.6 28.3 24.0 6.0 6.7 
OECD 22.0 26.6 36.8 33.4 16.5 17.1 
EU 21.2 25.1 42.8 36.8 19.3 18.7 
a:  These estimates are based on gross operating surplus. 
Source: Carey & Tchilinguirian (2000). ‘Average Effective Tax Rates on Capital, Labor 
and Consumption’, OECD Economics Department Working Papers No. 258. 
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AETR using Mendoza, Razin & Tesar (1994) methodology: 
OS
TTTI
capitalAETR tranpropcorpUBH
+++
=
)(
)(
t
 , where  
)( WI
T
ratiotaxHHEffective
UB
HH
H +
=ºt , and 
ºUBI Net unincorporated income from capital transactions, or precisely 
PEIOSPUEIUB +º , with 
=OSPUE Unincorporated business income (inc. rentals from owner-occupied housing) 
=PEI Interest, dividends and investment receipts. 
ºHHT Tax revenues on income, profits and capital gains of households. 
ºcorpT Tax revenues on income, profits and capital gains of corporations. 
ºW Wages and salaries of dependent employment. 
ºpropT Tax revenues from immovable property. 
ºtranT Tax revenues from financial and capital transactions. 
ºOS Net operating surplus of the overall economy, or precisely, 
WSSSGDPOS -= , with =WSSS  Total compensation of employees. 
 
AETR using Carey & Tchilinguirian (2000) methodology: 
 
selfself
tranpropUcorpUselfselfUBH
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capitalAETR
--
++++---
=
bbt )(
)(  , where 
)( UselfUB
HH
H SSWSI
T
ratiotaxHHEffective
--+-
=ºt ,  
OSTTWTTI tranpropcorpHHUB ,,,,,,  are same as before, and 
ºselfW wage bill of self employed, or precisely N
SW
NW selfself
)( -
= , with 
ºselfN Number of self em ployed. 
ºN Number of dependent employed. 
ºS Employees’ Social Security Contribution. 
ºselfS  Social Security Contribution of the self employed. 
ºUS Unallocated Social Security Contribution. 
ºb share of capital income in household income, or precisely, ab -= 1 , with 
ºa share of labor income in household income, and 
)(
)(
SWSI
WSW
selfUB
self
-+-
+-
=a  
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  Table 2A: Steady state ratios for the US economy, 1960-2002. 
Description Value 
Government consumption to output ratio. 0.23 
Profit to output ratio. 0.11 
Bond to output ratio 0.51 
Capital to output ratio. 3.31 
Investment to output ratio. 0.22 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Table 2B: Baseline parameter values. 
Parameter Description Value 
b  Subjective discount rate. 0.96 
d  Capital depreciation rate. 0.06 
a  Production function parameter. 0.57 
n  Production function parameter. 0.73 
s  Inverse of the elasticity of 0.15 
k  Fiscal treatment of distributed 0.63 
g  Utility function parameter 0.64 
z  Utility function parameter 1.0 
 
Table 3: The dynamic path of tax rates (First best and Ramsey). 
Dynamic path of tax rates 
( t ) Policy 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 20 
zt  -0.17 -0.17 -0.17 -0.17 -0.17 -0.17 -0.17 -0.17 -0.17 -0.17 -0.17 
Yt  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
First Best 
Policy 
q  -0.17 -0.17 -0.17 -0.17 -0.17 -0.17 -0.17 -0.17 -0.17 -0.17 -0.17 
zt  -0.35 -0.11 -0.10 -0.06 -0.06 -0.05 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
Yt  0.08 0.31 0.22 0.19 0.19 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 
Ramsey 
Policy 
q  1 1 1 1 1 0.22 0.22 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 
ºzt  labor tax rate in monopoly sector. 
ºyt  labor tax rate in competitive sector. 
ºq  capital tax rate. 
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Fig 4A: Utility cost of taxes vs. sigma.
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Fig4B: Capital Tax vs. sigma
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Fig 4C: Utility cost of taxes and capital tax rate vs. kappa
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